Trường DC | Giá trị | Ngôn ngữ |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Tran, Quoc Trung | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-01T10:23:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-01T10:23:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 1974-0020 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dlib.neu.edu.vn/handle/NEU/58649 | - |
dc.description | management Science | |
dc.description.abstract | Purpose – In this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market. Design/methodology/approach – We develop logit and tobit regression models to investigate the effects of ownership structure on the propensity to use independent directors and the number of independent directors on the board, respectively. Insider ownership and the use of independent directors are proposed to have a nonlinear relationship. Findings – With a sample of 1,318 observations collected from 192 listed firms over the period from 2008 to 2017, we find that insider ownership and independent director appointment have a U-shaped relationship. It is positive when insiders hold a small proportion of shares, and turns out to be negative when insiders hold a large percentage of shares. In addition, both state ownership and foreign ownership are negatively related to firm decisions of appointing independent directors. Practical implications – Our findings imply that minority shareholders should have appropriate actions to reduce agency costs and protect their own interests. In addition, policymakers should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation to increase the presence of independent directors in order to protect minority shareholders. Moreover, government agencies also need to increase the number of independent directors in state-controlled firms as a means to improve their corporate governance. Foreign investors may be a substitute for independent directors; therefore, firms without independent directors are able to improve their corporate governance by attracting foreign investors. Originality/value – While the extant literature shows that independent directors can help firms decrease agency costs of equity in financial decisions and performance, there are relatively few studies investigating corporate decisions to use independent directors. This paper contributes to the literature of corporate governance mechanisms through independent directors in emerging markets. | |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. Introduction; 2. Institutional environment, literature review and hypothesis development; 3. Research models; 4. Research data; 5. Results and discussion; 6. Conclusions | |
dc.format.extent | Khổ 21 x 29.7 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Kinh Tế Quốc Dân | |
dc.subject | Ownership structure | |
dc.subject | Independent directors | |
dc.subject | Emerging market | |
dc.subject | Vietnam | |
dc.title | Ownership structure and demand for independent directors: evidence from an emerging market | |
dc.type | Journal of Economics and Development | |
dc.identifier.barcode | 10-1108_JED-03-2020-0022 | |
dc.relation.reference | Alves, P., Couto, E.B. and Francisco, P.M. (2015), “Board of directors’ composition and capital structure”, Research in International Business and Finance, Vol. 35, pp. 1-32. Armstrong, C.S., Core, J.E. and Guay, W.R. (2014), “Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 113 No. 3, pp. 383-403. Cotter, J.F., Shivdasani, A. and Zenner, M. (1997), “Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 195-218. Hai, B.X. and Nunoi, C. (2008), “ Corporate governance in Vietnam: a system in transition” , Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp. 45-65. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 305-360. McGee, R.W. (2009), “An overview of corporate governance practices in Vietnam”, in McGee, R.W. McGee (Ed.), Corporate Governance in Developing Economies: Country Studies of Africa, Asia and Latin America, Springer US, Boston, MA. Minh, T.L. and Walker, G. (2008), “Corporate governance of listed companies in Vietnam”, Bond Law Review, Vol. 20 No. 2, Article. 6. Nguyen, D. (2008), Corporate Governance in Vietnam: Regulations, Practices and Problems, Central Institute for Economic Management, Hanoi, Vietnam, pp. 1-69. Peasnell, K.V., Pope, P.F. and Young, S. (2003), “Managerial equity ownership and the demand for outside directors”, European Financial Management, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 231-250. Peng, M.W. (2004), “Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 453-471. Sharma, V. (2011), “Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 1001-1015. Vo, X.V. (2018), “Foreign ownership and corporate cash holdings in emerging markets”, International Review of Finance, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 297-303. Wooldridge, J.M. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 10th, Cambridge. | |
Bộ sưu tập | 02. Tạp chí (Tiếng Anh) |
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Trường DC | Giá trị | Ngôn ngữ |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Tran, Quoc Trung | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-01T10:23:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-01T10:23:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 1974-0020 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dlib.neu.edu.vn/handle/NEU/58649 | - |
dc.description | management Science | |
dc.description.abstract | Purpose – In this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market. Design/methodology/approach – We develop logit and tobit regression models to investigate the effects of ownership structure on the propensity to use independent directors and the number of independent directors on the board, respectively. Insider ownership and the use of independent directors are proposed to have a nonlinear relationship. Findings – With a sample of 1,318 observations collected from 192 listed firms over the period from 2008 to 2017, we find that insider ownership and independent director appointment have a U-shaped relationship. It is positive when insiders hold a small proportion of shares, and turns out to be negative when insiders hold a large percentage of shares. In addition, both state ownership and foreign ownership are negatively related to firm decisions of appointing independent directors. Practical implications – Our findings imply that minority shareholders should have appropriate actions to reduce agency costs and protect their own interests. In addition, policymakers should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation to increase the presence of independent directors in order to protect minority shareholders. Moreover, government agencies also need to increase the number of independent directors in state-controlled firms as a means to improve their corporate governance. Foreign investors may be a substitute for independent directors; therefore, firms without independent directors are able to improve their corporate governance by attracting foreign investors. Originality/value – While the extant literature shows that independent directors can help firms decrease agency costs of equity in financial decisions and performance, there are relatively few studies investigating corporate decisions to use independent directors. This paper contributes to the literature of corporate governance mechanisms through independent directors in emerging markets. | |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. Introduction; 2. Institutional environment, literature review and hypothesis development; 3. Research models; 4. Research data; 5. Results and discussion; 6. Conclusions | |
dc.format.extent | Khổ 21 x 29.7 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Kinh Tế Quốc Dân | |
dc.subject | Ownership structure | |
dc.subject | Independent directors | |
dc.subject | Emerging market | |
dc.subject | Vietnam | |
dc.title | Ownership structure and demand for independent directors: evidence from an emerging market | |
dc.type | Journal of Economics and Development | |
dc.identifier.barcode | 10-1108_JED-03-2020-0022 | |
dc.relation.reference | Alves, P., Couto, E.B. and Francisco, P.M. (2015), “Board of directors’ composition and capital structure”, Research in International Business and Finance, Vol. 35, pp. 1-32. Armstrong, C.S., Core, J.E. and Guay, W.R. (2014), “Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 113 No. 3, pp. 383-403. Cotter, J.F., Shivdasani, A. and Zenner, M. (1997), “Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 195-218. Hai, B.X. and Nunoi, C. (2008), “ Corporate governance in Vietnam: a system in transition” , Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp. 45-65. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 305-360. McGee, R.W. (2009), “An overview of corporate governance practices in Vietnam”, in McGee, R.W. McGee (Ed.), Corporate Governance in Developing Economies: Country Studies of Africa, Asia and Latin America, Springer US, Boston, MA. Minh, T.L. and Walker, G. (2008), “Corporate governance of listed companies in Vietnam”, Bond Law Review, Vol. 20 No. 2, Article. 6. Nguyen, D. (2008), Corporate Governance in Vietnam: Regulations, Practices and Problems, Central Institute for Economic Management, Hanoi, Vietnam, pp. 1-69. Peasnell, K.V., Pope, P.F. and Young, S. (2003), “Managerial equity ownership and the demand for outside directors”, European Financial Management, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 231-250. Peng, M.W. (2004), “Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 453-471. Sharma, V. (2011), “Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 1001-1015. Vo, X.V. (2018), “Foreign ownership and corporate cash holdings in emerging markets”, International Review of Finance, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 297-303. Wooldridge, J.M. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 10th, Cambridge. | |
Bộ sưu tập | 02. Tạp chí (Tiếng Anh) |