Ấn phẩm
Large Shareholders and Firm Value: Interaction between Power and Incentive to Expropriate
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14
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Tóm tắt
This study examines the relationship between large shareholders and fim value and how this relation varies with the large shareholders’ power and incentive to expropriate a fim’s wealth. We fid this relation is U shaped with the turning point at around 45% and 65% for the largest shareholders and total blockholders, respectively. The higher the power (or higher control right) means the more the expropriation or lower fim value. However, in fims with controlling blockholders (beyond 50% control right approximately), blockholders have enough power to manipulate fim’s activities but their incentive to expropriate decreases due to private benefis being lower. This study also fids that fims in high investor protection countries are associated with higher values than those in low investor protection countries for any blockholding level, but the diffrence in fim value between weak investor protection countries and strong investor protection countries is highest when expropriation by blockholders is largest.
Mô tả
Economic
Tác giả
Nguyen, Thi Thuy
Tác giả khác
Người hướng dẫn
Nơi xuất bản
Nhà xuất bản
Kinh Tế Quốc Dân
Năm xuất bản
2018
ISSN tạp chí
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Từ khóa chủ đề
Ownership concentration , blockholders , Tobin’s Q , fim value.
